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0. Introduction
Whenever a new theory of argumentation becomes available on the English-speaking
market, such as it is happening now through the translation of Harald Wohlrapp’s The Concept of
Argument, one of the most interesting tasks is to work out how the new input will interact with
the work that has otherwise been done in the field.(Wohlrapp, 2014) It is the aim of this
contribution to clarify the relationship between Wohlrapp’s approach and the rhetorical branch of
argumentation theory. Wohlrapp’s own attitude towards rhetoric, as it appears in the book, is not
entirely unambiguous. He is especially worried about rhetoric’s focus on assent. An adequate
theory of argumentation, so Wohlrapp, should be able to offer ways to evaluate whether an
argument manages to provide justification for the validity of the claim it is meant to support.
Rhetorical argumentation theories concentrate mainly on the ability of arguments to gain assent
from the audience. But assent, so Wohlrapp, is at most an unreliable indicator for the goodness
of argumentation. After all, an audience might be influenced by irrational reasons and deny
assent even after having been provided a good argument or give assent to a thesis that has barely
been defended. (Wohlrapp, 2014, p.274)
Nonetheless, there are passages in the book that suggest Wohlrapp’s attitude towards
rhetoric is not wholly negative. In his chapter on frame-structures he uses the concept of frames
in order to integrate the influence of the arguer’s subjectivity on the process of argumentation
into his theory. Here he suggests that, should his theory manage to provide the conceptual tools
necessary to handle the influence of subjectivity on argumentation, this might be a way to bridge
“the gaps between knowledge and opinion as well as between validity-related argumentation and
impact-related rhetoric.” (Wohlrapp, 2014, p. 176) Even though he does not elaborate on this
claim, it points to the possibility that rhetoric might, after all, have a place in his theory of
argument. It is my aim to establish first, that rhetoric can indeed play an important role in
Wohlrapp’s theory by offering the necessary tools for managing frames and second, that
Wohlrapp’s worries about the influence of rhetoric are mitigated through the work already done
in rhetorical argumentation theory.
1. Subjectivity and Frames
Subjectivity has a prominent place in The Concept of Argument because, according to Wohlrapp,
the main purpose of argumentation is to submit our subjective constructions of new theory to
intersubjective scrutiny.
Theory has the purpose of orienting us in the world – to guide our practices. The entirety
of those theories we accept constitutes how we understand the world and our own actions within
it. It forms our orientation system, the theoretical lens through which we understand both
ourselves and everything that we encounter. (Wohlrapp, 2014, Chapter 1 and 3)
However, we regularily come across practical problems for which our established host of
theory cannot provide us with guidance. This is when our orientation system runs out. We need
new theory, and we need to argue in order to test this theory. In arguing, we try to determine

whether our new theory can be integrated successfully with the those parts of our orientation
system that are already succesfull in guiding our practices.(Wohlrapp, 2014, Chapter 2 and 3)
It is a common-place that everybody’s understanding of the world is somewhat different
from everybody elses. Our orientation-systems are not the same. On the one hand, this is the
reason why argumentation, as an intersubjective enterprise, provides us with the ability to test
our new theory before we take the risk of acting on it: the other’s perspective and knowledge
might be able to reveal problems – or solutions– that we, in our limited subjectivity, have not
been able to think of. In argumentation, the subjectivity of the other, their view of the world,
comes in contact with ours, and together we are able to access a less limited, intersubjective view
on the problem and its possible solution.
However, the influence of subjectivity on argumentaiton can also lead to problems and therefore,
so Wohlrapp, it is important that any theory of argumentation provides the necessary theoretical
tools to understand this influence. The concepts Wohlrapp uses in order to integrate the effects
of subjectivity on argumentation into his theory are those of frames and frame-structures.
(Wohlrapp, 2014, p. 175ff.)
What frames are is most easily explained using Wohlrapp’s own example of
Wittgenstein’s famous duck-rabbit head. (Wohlrapp, 2014, p. 191) As is well known, the
drawing of the duck-rabbit head ( from now on: H.) can be seen both as a duck and as a rabbit. In
order to understand the concept of a frame, imagine for a moment that you have only ever seen a
rabbit when you looked at H. Therefore, when you look at H, you see it in the frame [as rabbit].
The frame is the A [as B] structure that allows you to see a rabbit when you look at the lines that
make up H. (Wohlrapp, 2014, p. 176) However, H. can also be seen as a duck. But as long as
you are not aware of the possible frame H [as duck], you are not aware that you are seeing H [as
rabbit]. To you, there simply exists a picture of a rabbit, not a picture of a duck, and certainly not
a pictue of the duck-rabbit head. Wohlrapp calls frames that we do not know of latent frames.
(Wohlrapp, 2014, p. 183) If you see H. in a latent H. [as rabbit] frame, you do not know the other
ways to see H. and you do not know about your ignorance.
Of course, latent frames can become manifest. If you somehow realize that H. can also be seen as
a duck, then you become aware of the H. [as rabbit] frame, and the rabbit becomes a rabbitaspect. (Wohlrapp, 2014, p. 183) You are now able to switch between two manifest frames or
aspects of H. – H. [as rabbit] and H. [as duck]. However, by realizing the possibility of seeing H.
[as duck] you have not gotten rid of all your latent framings of H.. You now quite probably have
a laten frame H. [as duck-rabbit-head]. This frame holds together and orders the frames that are
available to you for H. In this function, it is called your primary frame of H. (Wohlrapp, 2014, p.
184) By integrating a new frame into your understanding of H., you changed your primary frame
for H. and thereby the way in which you constitute it – the kind of object it is in your world.
(Wohlrapp, 2014, p.192)
We frame everything that we interact with in the world. We need to, because we need to
be able to determine how we should understand it and what we can do with it. Our frames
determine the kinds of inferences we are willing to make about a situation. They determine not
only which claims about something we will judge to be true or false, but also which we will
consider to make sense, and which will appear senseless. The claim “H’s ears are too long.”
makes sense to you, who sees H [as rabbit] but not to your friend, who sees H [as duck].
Wohlrapp explains that frames bring with them a so-called inferential potential. The inferential
potential of a frame includes all those inferences that the frame allows and excludes those
inferences a frame does not allow. (Wohlrapp, 2014, p.188)

Through their inferential potential, frames determine which arguments we can follow and which
will appear like nonesense to us. An argument, according to Wohlrapp, connects a new thesis
with our basis of established theory in a way that makes it possible to see why the thesis might
be right, true or appropriate in the context of what we have already established. (Wohlrapp,
2014, p.73ff.) For this, it uses the inferential potential of the frame we presuppose. We are
generally able to understand all those inferences that are possible within our frame. Other
inferences are, to us, not possible. Arguments that use them to support a thesis might not make
sense to us. If an argument refers to an issue that the participating arguers frame differently, then
the framing differences can torpedo the entire argumentative encounter. For example, if we are
arguing whether your drawing, H., is a good drawing and I tell you that H.’s ears are too long,
then you, who only sees H. [as duck] do not know what I am talking about. (Wohlrapp, 2014,
p.191ff.) This is a misunderstanding that might be easily corrected if the problem lies with a
difference between frames that are manifest to both of us. If the problem lies with latent frames,
we will only be able to continue our argument if we suceed in making the latent frames manifest.
This is so because the way we constitute the world through our primary frames determines and
limits our ability to reason. If the basic constitution we each pressupose for the part of the world
that we are arguing about is different, then we cannot understand each other’s inferences. We
need to make our different latent frames manifest and gain access to their inferential potentials
before we can continue.
2. Rhetoric
2.1 Rhetoric’s Usefulness for Managing Subjectivity and Frames1
Wohlrapp recognizes that accessing a new frame for a subject matter can completely
change the status of our theory about that subject matter. The theory with which we orient our
actions is always built with a certain way to frame the world in the background. The
constructions with which we argue for our theses use the inferential potential of our frames.
Once a new frame becomes accessible, an argumentative construction that seemed perfectly fine
in an old frame can suddenly appear entirely inadequate.2 By integrating the concept of frames
into his argumentation theory, Wohlrapp accounts for this possibility. However, managing
frames is not his main interest in The Concept of Argument. He remains sensitive to the influence
of subjectivity on argumentation throughout his work by referring, time and again, to the fact
that the way in which we constitute the world through frames influences the boundaries within
which we must reason. (Wohlrapp, 2014, p. 361ff.) But while he goes into considerable detail
about the practice of argumentation within frames he only makes relatively short suggestions
about how to handle differences between frames once they have been made manifest. (Wohlrapp,
2014, p. 204ff.) And apart from a short reference to reflection as a way to reach new ways to
constitute the world, he does not deal much with how we are to manage situations in which we
suspect that latent frames might be the problem. (Wohlrapp, 2014, p. 369ff.) However, remarks
like the one cited in the introduction suggest that Wohlrapp suspects that the work done in
rhetorical argumentation theory might be helpful here.
Rhetorical argumentation theory more than shares Wohlrapp’s focus on the subjectivity
of those engaged in argumentation. It is most interested in argumentation as an act of
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Parts of the argument presented here can be found, in greater detail, in (von Radziewksy, 2012)
See, e.g. the example Wohlrapp describes at (Wohlrapp, 2014, p. 202ff.)

communication, an interaction between arguer and audience.3 Rhetoric sees the arguer as doing
work on the subjectivity of the audience in order to guide them to an understanding of the
arguer’s thesis as acceptable. As Crosswhite puts it,
“[t]he claimant understands the audience to be in need of change, so there is a conflict set
up between the audience as it is and the audience as the claimant would like it to be. (…)If there
were not an audience in need of change-change in knowledge, perspective, intent, sympathy,
mood, awareness, any kind of change-there would be no claim, no argumentation.”4
Accordingly, rhetorical argumentation theorists share with Wohlrapp the idea that
arguments are always formulated under the influence of the subjectivity of those who argue.
Therefore, they advocate that arguers first determine their target audience and then construct
their arguments to fit this audience.5 A good rhetorical argument takes the audience from where
it already is to where the arguer wants it to be. In order to be able to do this, the arguer needs to
get to know the audience: she needs to study the audience’s subjectivity. This necessity to get to
know the audience is reflected especially in the concept of the cognitive environment that we
encounter in Christopher Tindale’s rhetorical theory.6 An audience’s cognitive environment does
not only include the beliefs and knowledge the audience currently has, or the facts it is currently
aware of. Rather, it includes all those facts and claims that it can perceive or infer, all those
things that are, so to say, in the audience’s cognitive reach. (Tindale, 2015, p. 145) I suggest that,
put in Wohlrapp’s terms, the cognitive environment can be said to contain all those claims, ideas
and facts that can be reached through the inferential potential of an audience’s primary framing
of the world. If this is correct, then to understand an audience’s cognitive environment with
respect to the subject matter addressed by the rhetorician is also means to understand what the
audience’s primary frame of that subject matter is. A good rhetorical argument makes use only of
those first premises that can be accessed by the audience through the inferential potential of their
frame. A good rhetorician investigates the way her audience frames the subject matter and uses
the inferences accessible to them in order to guide them to the conclusion she is supporting.
Given this perspective on the practice of argumentation, it makes sense that rhetorical
argumentation theory focuses on all the tools with which an arguer can influence her audience
including those with which, in Wohlrapp’s terms, an arguer can change the primary frames of
her audience. And because rhetorical argumentation theory is interested in the ways in which
rhetorical moves can be instruments to manipulate the way in which audiences see and think of
subject matters, all argumentative and stylistic moves are viewed with the same interest: an
interest in their ability to access minds. Therefore, rhetoric includes in the argumentative arsenal
all devices with which an arguer can communicate content to their audience in order to influence
them in ways that might generate acceptance for the thesis the arguer is supporting.7 This
includes arguments of the shape modus ponens as well as analogies and even means that merely
influence the presence a certain idea has in the audience’s minds.8 This disposition to investigate
3

This picture can easily be recast to fit the dialogical setting in which Wohlrapp operates by imagining arguers who
are engaged in dialogue as switching back and forth between the role of the arguer and that of the audience.
4
Crosswhite, 1996, p. 136/37
5
see, e.g. Perelman and Olbrechts Tyteca, 1969, p. 19, Crosswhite, 1996, p 136 f, Tindale, 1999, p. 85
6
See, e.g. Tindale 1992 and 2015, p. 144ff. He adapts this concept from one introduced by Sperber and Wilson
(Sperber and Wilson, 1985, p. 39)
7
The interest of rhetorical argumentation theory in the communication of insight is well documented, for example,
in Tindale’s The Philosophy of Argument and Audience Reception, which goes into great detail when it comes to
theories of communication and language. (Tindale, 2015)
8
See, e.g. the collection of argumentative means in Perelman and Olbrecht Tyteca (1969)

all ways in which an audience can be influenced – including those ways that make new
perspectives accessible - makes rhetorical argumentation theory a good candidate for providing
the theoretical means for describing how arguers manage frames. Important work in this
direction has already been done, for example by Christopher Tindale, with the concept of
invitational rhetoric.(e.g. Tindale, 2009)
The idea of invitational rhetoric is that the arguer uses her knowledge of the audience’s
cognitive environment and her ability to communicate in order to encourage the audience to take
part in the construction of those arguments and perspectives that will be able to give them insight
into the correctness of her claim. The arguer uses rhetorical means that carry the audience only
part of the way and require them to finish the reasoning process begun by her, allowing the
audience to understand what the arguer is saying on their own terms.9 The resulting view on
argumentation is one in which the arguer appears almost as a teacher, giving the audience tasks
that, if it completes them, will lead it closer and closer to an understanding of the subject matter
under which the arguers claim will appear acceptable.
As I have argued at length elsewhere (von Radziewsky,2012), this makes invitational
rhetoric especially promising when it comes to managing frames. We have already seen the
frame-differences can lead to serious problems in argumentation. It is necessary that arguers
have means both to communicate which aspect of a subject matter they are utilizing in their
argument10 and to enable others to gain insight into the frames they are presupposing in their
argument if their interlocutors cannot yet access them. Let me illustrate the way in which the
invitational use of rhetorical means might help here with two examples.
An arguer who recognizes that her interlocutor has misunderstood the aspect of a subject matter
her argument is utilizing, but knows that this aspect is accessible to her interlocutor at least to
some degree, may overcome the misunderstanding by using presence inducing rhetorical means.
For example, if her argument about ethical meat-consumption rests on the use of the frame
animal [as moral patient], she may use a narrative about her interlocutors dog to give presence to
the fact that the interlocutor already frames (some) animals as moral patients.
Alternatively, an arguer might suspect that the seeming inability of her interlocutor to understand
and engage meaningfully with her reasoning might stem from the fact that the interlocutor’s
primary frame of the subject matter does not give him access to the frame she is using in her
argument. Then the arguer may utilize invitational rhetorical means to manipulate her
interlocutor’s cognitive environment in such a way that insight into a new frame becomes as easy
as possible. For example, Thompson’s famous violinist-analogy can be used in this way11:
Thompson wants to make a certain frame for pregnancy available that, she suspects, her
9

The use of metaphors and analogies is an example: Understand Sam as a tropical storm, then you will see that you
cannot trust him! communicates to the audience that there is a perspective on Sam which will reveal him as lessthan-trustworthy and that this perspective can be accessed if the audience manages to restructure their understanding
of Sam according to their understanding of tropical storms
10
that is, which manifest frame’s inferential potential they are developing in their argument
11
““You wake up in the morning and find yourself back to back in bed with an unconscious violinist. A
famous unconscious violinist. He has been found to have a fatal kidney ailment, and the Society of Music
Lovers has canvassed all the available medical records and found that you alone have the right blood type to
help. They have therefore kidnapped you, and last night the violinist's circulatory system was plugged into
yours, so that your kidneys can be used to extract poisons from his blood as well as your own. The
director of the hospital now tells you, "Look, we're sorry the Society of Music Lovers did this to you-we
would never have permitted it if we had known. But still, they did it, and the violinist now is plugged into
you. To unplug you would be to kill him. But never mind, it's only for nine months. By then he will have
recovered from his ailment, and can safely be unplugged from you."” (Thompson, 1971, p. 48f.)

interlocutors might not be able to access. In order to do so, she uses her knowledge about the
way her interlocutors frame other subject matters – abduction, forced medical procedures – to
construct an inferential system parallel to that which is accessible in the frame she wants to
communicate and presents it as the source of an analogy. Her interlocutors, in the attempt to
understand the analogy, restructure their understanding of pregnancy according to the abductionstory she tells and thereby gain insight into Thompson’s pregnancy frame.12
2.2 The Dangers of Rhetoric and an Ethical Condition for Validity
The idea to integrate rhetoric into Wohlrapp’s theory in order to gain the theoretical tools
to describe how arguers could manage frames, either by signalling in which frame they are
arguing or by making new frames accessible, comes with its risks. Unfortunately, a rhetorician
who has gained the ability to influence the way her audience frames the subject matter has, in her
hands, a dangerous tool. There are sections of The Concept of Argument in which Wohlrapp
views the field of traditional rhetoric with deep suspicion. He is concerned that using rhetoric
might exploit the role subjectivity plays in argumentation. The rhetorician, so the worry, does not
treat the interlocutor as an opponent whose subjectivity is an indispensible component in the
process of testing the argumentative validity of a thesis. Instead, she treats the interlocutor as an
audience who’s subjectivity needs to be understood only so far as to determine those
communicative moves that will distract her enough from possible objections to gain her assent
without having to go through the bothersome business of actually arguing. To the rhetorician,
Wohlrapp suggests, subjectivity might merely be a “web of conditions that have to be taken into
consideration for obtaining the desired acceptance.” (Wohlrapp, 2014, p. 95) Rhetoric is
primarily a tool of “persuasion” and “manipulation”, instead of argumentation. (Wohlrapp, 2014,
p. xxxvi)
However, even if we accept the idea that rhetoric is mainly a tool for the manipulation of
the audience’s mind, I believe that it can be justified to integrate this tool and its study into
Wohlrapp’s theory. This is so because I want to suggest that managing frames, and especially the
making-accessible of a new frame, is a matter of shared insight.
Wohlrapp makes a distinction between acceptance and insight – and he suggests that
rhetoric might matter when it comes to the attempt to share one’s insight with another person.
(Wohlrapp, 2014, p. 274) Insight, so Wohlrapp, is the intellectual and emotional impression of
fit. To have an insight into the correctness of a thesis means to perceive it as right and enriching.
Insight should imply acceptance, because someone who has insight into the correctness of a
thesis feels that she understands how the thesis fits with the basis of established theory in such a
way that it can provide the missing orientation. However, acceptance and insight do not always
appear together because people have reasons outside of perceived validity to give or withhold
assent: Assent might be given where insight is missing because of the personality of the speaker,
or it might be withheld out of embarrassment, for example. In addition, insight alone cannot
show validity. The fit of the thesis with surrounding orientation is not yet formulated in a
construction of reasons and could therefore still turn out to be illusionary. And even if such a
construction of reasons can be established, before the thesis can be considered valid it still has to
be tested with the objections of another. Before a thesis can be considered valid, then, the insight
that the thesis fits has to be made manifest by connecting the thesis to the surrounding orientation
system through reasons, and testing the resulting construction through argumentation.
12

In Pulling Strings: Using Rhetoric to Deal with Subjectivity in Argumentation, I have elaborated on this thought
(von Radziewsy, 2012). For work of a way to understand arguments by analogy within the Wohlrappian system, see
(Mengel, 1995)

(Wohlrapp, 2014, p.272ff.) Nonetheless, Wohlrapp believes that shared insight can be a sign that
the thesis is worthwhile because it reduces the risk that the perception of fit might be an illusion
caused by factors wholly outside the actual relationship between thesis and orientation system.
Shared insight, Wohlrapp suggests, is then what should actually be described as Chaim
Perelman’s “meeting of the minds” – it is an indication that two people have achieved a situation
in which they see a part of the world in the same way. Therefore Wohlrapp considers it
regrettable that instead of targeting the communication of insight, rhetoric is preoccupied with
assent and acceptance. (Wohlrapp, 2014, p.274f.)
At first sight, Wohlrapp’s worry that rhetorical argumentation theory might advocate exploiting
the audience’s subjectivity in order to elicit assent seems justified. After all, rhetorical
argumentation theorists suggest understanding the audience’s cognitive environment in order to
be more successful at changing their subjectivity. In addition, they do not limit the means that
can be used in this enterprise to the use of valid inferences, but instead allow the use of rhetorical
figures including those that are, in the argumentation theory community, widely regarded as
fallacious. This has the bitter taste of manipulation. However, I would like to point out, first, that
Wohlrapp’s own description of argumentation outside of frames – argumentation that works with
the way we constitute the world, suggests that frames can only be managed through the rhetorical
use of language aimed at generating insight instead of showing argumentative validity. Second, I
would like to show that the rhetorical criterion for validity, the universal audience, can be added
to Wohlrapp’s own conditions of argumentative validity in order to mitigate the worry of the
manipulative rhetorician.
Wohlrapp suggests that we have to find new frames through reflection. We are already
engaged with the subject matter in our practices, otherwise we would not have come across a
problem in our orientation. Therefore, we have a point of access to it that we can use when we
try to find new theoretical articulations. These articulations are supposed to lead to new or
changed basic constitution for our subject matter – a new frame. (Wohlrapp, 2014, p.369ff.)
However, a new frame cannot be made accessible through the normal use of arguments
composed from inferences, and its adequacy cannot be judged in the same way we usually judge
new theses. This is so because frames cannot be accessed through inferences that use the
inferential potential of existing frames. Wohlrapp suggests instead, the acceptability of a new
frame reveals itself only with reference to our practices and our other established theory: We
need to recognize, in our new theoretical articulations, what we do in our practice and how we
view the world otherwise. We gain access to a new frame when the theoretical formulations that
articulates it fit and eluminate our practical experience. (Wohlrapp, 2014, p.369ff.) I believe that
this suggests that the insight into a new frame needs to be communicated with whatever means
necessary – because argumentation based on inferences does not work here, invitational rhetoric
is the only option: An arguer who is trying to make a new frame accessible to their interlocutor
needs to substantiate the claim that the subject matter can be seen from a completely different
perspective – a perspective that opens up a new inferential potential able to support a new
construction of reasons and finally a new thesis. However, the interlocutor cannot be forced to
understand this new perspective through a construction of reasons because there is no shared
frame with an inferential potential out of which this construction could be build. Instead, the
arguer has to aim at making her interlocutor see the new frame. In order to do this, she needs to
communicate with the goal of changing the way the interlocutor sees the world – if only for long
enough that the interlocutor can access the new frame. And the interlocutor, if she is interested in
determining whether this new frame actually exists, has to give into the arguer’s manipulation

without resistance, at least as long as it takes to make the new frame accessible. The arguer, in
turn, has only communicative means in order to achieve this effect – after all, she cannot reach
directly into her interlocutor’s head and change things around. But change things around is
exactly what she must do, and for so long that a new theoretical picture of the world develops. In
other words: she needs to use communicative means in order to manipulate her interlocutor for
long enough to generate an insight into the world as it is seen from the new frame. And because
seeing the world through a new frame is enough to substantiate the claim that this frame is
possible (though, of course, not that it is appropriate or even fruitful), insight alone is enough to
substantiate the claim that a certain frame exists. It is then the arguer’s ability to generate insight
in her interlocutor that will determine whether her claim that a new frame exists is true, or
whether she must be lying or mistaken. Because arguments cannot force access to a new frame,
the arguer has to fall back to the manipulative instruments of rhetoric.
Now, it is true that this option is risky, because it gives a considerable amount of power
to the arguer who manipulates the way her audience frames the world. Therefore, this use of
communication can only be allowed if the danger of abuse can be mitigated. However, the
condition of validity that is suggested by rhetorical argumentation theory excludes arguments
that exploit this power from the category of valid arguments. The interest of rhetoric is
concentrated on the ways in which arguers influence each other. In other words, rhetoric studies
argumentation as human interaction. The normative demand to produce valid argumentation
within the context of rhetorical argumentation, therefore, manifests itself as an ethical demand
that rests on the arguer who aims at producing valid argumentation. It is to treat every audience
both as a particular audience whose ability to follow the argument is limited by their cognitive
environment (primary frames) and as the universal audience. (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca,
1969)
The discussion around the nature of the universal audience is very complex and cannot be
resolved here. However, this much can be said: The universal audience contains both the arguer
herself and every arguer who is willing and able to understand the arguments presented,
evaluates the thesis only in reference to them, and formulates an objection. Gaining the assent of
the universal audience, therefore, implies two things: The arguer has to provide arguments that
are able to gain her own assent, and the arguer has to provide arguments that are composed in
such a way that they are meant to be able to survive all those objections the arguer is aware
of.(Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, p. 44)13
Wohlrapp discusses the universal audience but ultimately rejects it as too vague to deliver
useful conditions for testing an argument for validity. The problem is that the mere fact that an
arguer addresses the universal audience can give no indication of whether her arguments are
indeed valid. This is not even the case if – as Tindale suggests – the established criteria of
rationality as they are known to the arguer are integrated into the concept of the universal
audience. Wohlrapp remarks that even these criteria and their application are expressions of the
arguer’s subjectivity, and therefore would need to be open for discussion. This would then lead
to the development of criteria of validity far away from the concept of the universal audience as
it was originally introduced. (Wohlrapp, 2014, p.xlvii)
However, no matter how justified Wohlrapp’s rejection of the universal audience as the
only criterion for argumentative validity is, I believe the core of the idea can still be useful. If
rhetoric is to be integrated into Wohlrapps account as the theory that describes the managing of
frames, then an additional criterion for validity is needed, one that distinguishes legitimate from
13

For an extended version of this line of thought, please see (von Radziewsky and Tindale, 2012, p. 110/111)

illegitimate uses of rhetorical means. It is true that, as Wohlrapp notes, the assumption that the
arguer was addressing the universal audience is not enough to show that one should accept their
thesis. (Wohlrapp, 2014, p.368) But the idea of the universal audience does not have to be used
deliver a criterion by which we can determine the validity of an argument. Alternatively, the idea
of the universal audience could be used in order to express the ethical standard of respect for the
audience.14 Translated into the terms developed in Wohlrapp’s own theory, this means: If the
arguer can only produce valid arguments if she addresses the universal audience alongside her
target audience, then she is prevented from abusing the audience’s weaknesses. This includes
that she may not threaten, flatter or emotionally trick them into assenting. But it also includes
that she may not abuse her knowledge of the audiences primary frames. I suggest that the
universal audience could be used as a criterion for validity that is not targeted at the inferential
structures the arguer presents in her construction from the knowledge base to the thesis. Rather,
in the context of Wohlrapp’s system, it could be a criterion of validity that affects – among
others - the choice of frame in which the arguer builds this construction in the first place. It
would then be an ethical criterion about the way an arguer has to approach the subjectivity of her
audience. It specifies that an arguer may only try to elicit assent by attempting to generate insight
– the perceived fit of a thesis into a certain frame – and specifically only insight that the arguer
shares – the perceived fit of a thesis into a frame not only the audience but also the arguer finds
appropriate.
Of course, this ethical criterion would not need to be called “universal audience”.
However, I believe that I am right to assert that rhetorical argumentation theory, if it was to be
important into Wohlrapp’s theory to provide the theoretical means to describe how we manage
frames, already brings with it the criterion that holds rhetoric in check – in the form of the
universal audience. Rhetorical argumentation theory does not view argumentation as a tool that
arguers may use to gain assent from audiences in any way they please. Like other theories of
argumentation, it views arguments aimed at deceiving the audience as invalid. Unlike other
theories, it bases this invalidity not on the failure to meet criteria about the way inferences may
be used to build arguments, but instead on the failure to meet the ethical demand to treat one’s
audience with respect.
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